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 Executive Summary 
 
This research, generously supported by the Mellon-MIT Inter-University Program on Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Forced Migration, sought to explore the question of 
whether the revolving fund of a small credit union in rural Cameroon contributed to the 
mitigation of conflict and displacement in the immediate area.  The starting hypothesis was that 
the process by which loan recipients implemented their borrowed funds caused them to come 
into contact with people with whom they had major differences or tensions.  This contact, it was 
argued, provided an opportunity to ameliorate the tension and thus stabilize the village.  
 
Two months of field research during the summer of 2003 identified several conflict factors in the 
Foyet community, including agro-pastoral problems, political and religious problems, family 
issues, and generalized problems of poverty.  The last of these issues was found to cause a fair 
amount of emigration from Foyet, with the other problems being sources of destabilization in the 
area but, by and large, not sources of out-migration.  The credit union in question, Caisse 
Villagoise d’Epargne et de Crédit (CVEC), was found not to play the mitigation role through the 
process of loan implementation as originally hypothesized.  However, it does seem to be playing 
a stabilizing role economically, in that some credit union members explicitly stated that they had 
chosen to remain in the village despite the problems listed above, because they had access to 
loans in times of need.  This broadened the realm of possible conflict/displacement mitigation 
roles for the CVEC microcredit program from a process-oriented mechanism to an indirect 
stabilization role through general livelihood support.  From there a hypothetical “direct” role was 
also envisaged for CVEC, in which loans might be used to directly address or solve the conflict 
factors identified by interviewees. 
 
This research agenda has broader implications.  To the degree that the research shows CVEC’s 
microcredit services could be an effective conflict mitigation tool, other organizations providing 
microcredit programming in regions vulnerable to the outbreak of violence may wish to consider 
incorporating more explicit conflict mitigation mechanisms into their operations.   
 
A Note on Research Protocol.  Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects establishes 
guidelines for the conduct of research involving living human subjects.  All Tufts University 
research projects involving data collection through interaction with human subjects or collection 
of identifiable private information is subject to review by the Tufts University Institutional 
Review Board (IRB).  There are exceptions to this requirement, however; the Code of Federal 
Regulations states that under the following circumstance this review is not required: 
 
Research involving the use of educational tests, survey procedures, interview 
procedures, or observation of public behavior UNLESS the information is 
recorded in a manner in which the subject can be identified AND disclosure 
would place the subject at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to 
financial standing, employability, or reputation.  This does not apply where the 
subjects are children except where it involves passive observation of public 
behavior.1    
                                                 
1 Research Involving Human Subjects and the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Tufts University, 
(accessed 19 December 2003), available at: 
http://www.tufts.edu/provost/initiatives/tuftsafricaforum/medford-irb.doc. 
 iv
  
The field research met this exemption criterion in that disclosure of the subjects’ responses will 
not place them at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to their financial standing, 
employability, or reputation; as such, the project was not reviewed by IRB.  All interviewees 
were told of the nature of the research and that their responses would be used to assist CVEC in 
better understanding its role in conflict and displacement mitigation. 
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The Role of Microcredit in Conflict and Displacement Mitigation: 
A Case Study in Cameroon2
 
Stacy Heen3
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This research project explored current and future trends in displacement in a conflict-prone 
region of northwest Cameroon.  More specifically, research focused on the impact of the Caisse 
Villagoise d’Epargne et Credit (CVEC), a savings and credit union located in the village of 
Foyet, on the mitigation of local conflict tensions with an eye toward examining whether and 
how the caisse reduced local displacement of residents.  This research proposal originated with 
CVEC itself, on whose behalf Flaubert Djateng4 applied for funding from the Tufts University 
Feinstein International Famine Center’s Alchemy Project.5   
 
Foyet is a village of some 5000 residents in the Noun Department, a division of the Western 
Province of Cameroon bordering Nigeria.  The predominantly Muslim area, whose capital is 
Foumban, is largely rural, and access to the larger commercial centers is limited due to poor road 
conditions.  According to Djateng’s Alchemy Project grant proposal and subsequent email 
correspondence with him, the area CVEC serves is susceptible to destabilization from a variety 
of factors.  There are a number of open conflicts in the community including disagreements 
between farmers and cattle raisers, Muslim factions, and political parties, as well as conflicts 
over land tenure and the exploitation of natural resources.  Reportedly, a number of latent 
conflicts exist as well.  These include differences between the Muslim community and the small 
but active Christian minority, groups of young people, the educated and the non-educated, and 
conflicts related to cattle theft and unequal access to infrastructure.  The potential for conflict 
escalation is further exacerbated by national-level issues including extreme government 
corruption6, limited political freedoms under the Paul Biya regime (whose party the sultan of 
Noun belongs to), and the actual or potential cross-border flow of refugees from Nigeria. 
 
                                                 
2 I am indebted to many people for making this research possible.  I am grateful to Professor Karen 
Jacobsen for assistance with my research proposal and to the Mellon-MIT Inter-University Program on 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Forced Migration, with generous support from The 
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, for funding the research. Words cannot express my gratitude to Flaubert 
Djateng, my Cameroonian “Papa,” for his professional and personal assistance throughout my stay in 
Cameroon.  The entire Projet Appui aux Initiatives de Base et des Groupements de Soutien (AAOB) staff 
in Foumban was exceptionally helpful, from the drivers to the staff accountant.  Christiane Kayser offered 
invaluable insights into all things Cameroonian, and the CVEC management committee was tirelessly 
helpful in arranging interviews and translating for days on end.  All errors in this report are solely mine. 
3 Stacy Heen, a Masters student at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, holds a Masters of City 
Planning from MIT.  Please address correspondence to Stacy.Heen@tufts.edu. 
4 Djateng is the Projet AAOB director for the German development agency Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ); his work focuses on capacity building of local institutions in and around 
Foumban. 
5 This funding is intended to augment CVEC’s revolving fund and increase its capacity to meet the needs 
of its 20,000-strong potential client base. 
6 Transparency International ranked Cameroon the 124h least corrupt out of 133 countries in its 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003, available from http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/. 
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 To date, violence in the area has been localized, short in duration, and small-scale in nature.  
There are occasional skirmishes between cattle raisers and farmers when the cattle owned by 
nomadic tribes passing through the area eat or trample the crops grown by local growers; and in 
2002, factional differences between the Wahabi and Tidjiani communities over prayer rituals led 
to clashes that required police intervention and the six-month closure of the main mosque in 
Foumban.  Many young people tend to see no future for themselves in the Noun department, and 
leave the villages for the larger towns where they may become petty criminals in order to 
survive.  They often return to the villages after being chased out of Yaoundé or Douala by the 
police; these communities then tend to see a rise in crime and increased family tensions.7
 
This, then, is the environment in which CVEC—the largest financial services institution in the 
immediate area—operates.  In terms of its revolving fund, CVEC grants two general types of 
loans.  The predominant type of approved application involves some productive project such as 
buying agricultural inputs, paying field laborers, transporting produce, paying storage fees, or 
buying small equipment.  The second type of credit is for school fees for children (viewed by the 
community as an important social investment and a deterrent to their taking up criminal activity) 
or for medical needs. 
 
Djateng makes the case that “the planning and implementing of these investments force people to 
get together regularly8 and opens doors for social dialogue.  The most difficult conflicts are those 
where people do not communicate.  So a lot of minor and middle level conflicts can be handled 
this way.”9  This provocative and interesting claim suggests the possibility of microcredit 
programs being an effective tool for the mitigation of conflict and displacement.  This claim is at 
the heart of this research agenda. 
 
 
II. CENTRAL RESREACH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
The central research question is: does CVEC’s revolving fund contribute to the mitigation of 
conflict and displacement in the area, and if so, how?  Djateng hypothesized in his proposal to 
the Alchemy Program that the process by which CVEC loans are implemented causes 
beneficiaries to come into contact with, discuss, and ultimately resolve other conflicts to which 
they are a party.  He further suggested that this, in turn, helped to stabilize the area.   
 
This research sought to address three main threads of this hypothesis.  First, are the beneficiaries 
of CVEC’s micro-credit programming party to the tensions that put the community at risk of 
conflict and displacement?  Second, does the CVEC micro-credit lending program contribute to 
the amelioration of these tensions?  Third, what is the relationship between the amelioration of 
tensions at this level and the broader potential for conflict and displacement in the area? 
 
                                                 
7 The problems described in this section come from Djateng’s “Research Project Cameroon:  CVEC 
Foyet/Alchemy” as translated by Christiane Kayser. 
8 Djateng gives the examples of beneficiaries pooling their CVEC loan funds to buy seeds at discount 
prices, or beneficiaries working together to build storage buildings or school rooms.  Email from Flaubert 
Djateng to Tsering Gellek, 5 March 2003. 
9 Ibid. 
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 In addressing this issue, this research agenda has broader implications.  To the degree that the 
research shows CVEC’s microcredit services to be an effective conflict mitigation tool, 
organizations that offer microcredit programs in regions vulnerable to the outbreak of violence 
may wish to consider incorporating more explicit conflict management goals into their 
operations.  The advisability of this proposal will be discussed in the Conclusions section. 
 
 
III. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
A.  Definitions  
 
Before reviewing the various related literatures on this subject, the use of the terms micro-credit, 
conflict, conflict mitigation, and displacement in this report should be clarified. 
 
The Grameen Bank defines microcredit as “programmes [which] extend small loans to very poor 
people for self-employment projects that generate income, allowing them to care for themselves 
and their families.”10  These programmes can be administered via various institutional structures 
such as associations, bank guarantees, community banks, cooperatives, credit unions, groups, 
individuals, intermediaries, non-governmental organizations, rotating savings and credit 
associations, small businesses, or village banks.11  CVEC’s structure is that of a credit union, a 
member-driven arrangement in which each member’s long-term savings go into a pool from 
which loans are available to other members at an agreed-upon interest rate.  It is a democratic 
non-profit cooperative, which is to say that CVEC’s members “own” the caisse, electing its 
directors and committee members at regular intervals.  Further, membership in CVEC is open to 
all, regardless of religion, ethnicity, political persuasion, or gender, provided individuals are 
considered to have good “moral character”12 and are able to meet the modest initial savings 
deposit requirement and pay the non-refundable one-time 100f13 membership fee. 
 
The term conflict refers to the use of armed, lethal violence by individuals or groups against 
other groups; in other words, this means more than individual-on-individual violent crime.  To 
distinguish between acute violence of this nature—which is thus far not occurring in this part of 
Cameroon—and the underlying or motivating causes of such violence, the terms tensions or 
conflict factors are used to describe the latter. 
 
                                                 
10 “What is Microcredit?” Grameen Bank (accessed 29 September 2003), available at:  
http://www.grameen-info.org/mcredit/definit.html.  
11 “Microfinance-Credit Lending Models,” Grameen Bank (accessed 29 September 2003), available at:  
http://www.grameen-info.org/mcredit/cmodel.html  
12 Despite efforts to obtain a clear definition of this term, I was unable to clarify what “good moral 
character” entails.  It is not elucidated in any CVEC documents. 
13 Cameroonian currency is the Communaute Financiere Africaine Franc (FCFA).  At the time of the 
field research, the exchange rate was approximately 600 FCFA = $1 USD. 
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 Conflict mitigation refers to the amelioration of conflict factors or tensions.  Unlike the definition 
promulgated by Creative Associates International,14 it is not used here in reference to the 
reduction of violence but instead to the reduction in misperceptions, misunderstandings, and non-
violent disagreements or disputes.   
 
Displacement in this report refers to migration that results from conflict or economic factors. 
 
B.  Peacebuilding in Development Literature 
 
Most broadly, this research is about the nexus between development and conflict resolution, a 
nexus that has gained prominence and attention over the last decade as post Cold-War intra-state 
violent conflicts have become progressively more destructive and widespread.  Increasingly, the 
international community has shifted from crisis response to crisis prevention mode, as seen in 
such publications as Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1995 An Agenda for Peace and the 1997 Carnegie 
Commission report Preventing Deadly Conflict.  Indeed, Edward Luck argues that “[s]ince 1990, 
much of the United Nations community has taken to the challenge of conflict prevention like a 
duck to water.”15   
 
Mary Anderson is one of the leading proponents of the connection between development aid and 
conflict.  In her 1996 book Do No Harm:  How Aid Can Support Peace—or War, Anderson 
argues persuasively that aid projects need to consider the conflict impacts of their work and 
offers a “connector/divider” analytical framework to assess a given development project’s 
impact on conflict.  Anderson and Heinrich further advocate the need for “local capacities for 
peace” an approach that “seeks potential entry points for conflict transformation through 
development aid.”16  In the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Bigdon and Korf 
write on the role of development aid in conflict transformation, citing its potential for facilitating 
empowerment.  However, most of these writers focus on development during conflict, not in a 
pre-conflict context as exists in the current research inquiry.17   
 
Anderson and Bock’s 1999 article "Dynamite Under the Intercommunal Bridge: How Can Aid 
Agencies Help Defuse It?" addresses this gap in the literature.  In considering communal 
conflicts, they argue that “the difficult question facing aid agencies is how to combine what they 
have done traditionally and often, well…with strategies that effectively foster harmonious 
                                                 
14 “A Glossary on Violent Conflict Terms and Concepts Used in Conflict Prevention, Mitigation, and 
Resolution in the Context of Disaster Relief and Sustainable Development,” CRInfo (accessed 29 
September 2003), available at: 
http://www.crinfo.org/link_frame.cfm?linkto=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ecerti%2Eorg%2Fpublications
%2Frelated%5Fpapers%2Fterms%2Fcover%5Fterms%2Ehtm&parenturl=http%3A%2F%2Fpayson%2Et
ulane%2Eedu%2F&reffrom=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ecolorado%2Eedu%2Fconflict%2F.  
15 Edward C. Luck, “Prevention:  Theory and Practice” in Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, 
Eds., From Reaction to Conflict Prevention:  Opportunities for the UN System, (2002, Boulder/London, 
Lynne Rienner), 251. 
16 As cited in Bigdon, Christine and Benedikt Korf, “The Role of Development Aid in Conflict 
Transformation:  Facilitating Empowerment Processes and Community Building” in A. Austin, Fischer 
M., Ropers N., Eds. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (2001. Berlin: Berghof Research 
Center for Constructive Conflict Management), 1. 
17 Anderson has initiated a “Steps Toward Conflict Prevention” project that aims to address this 
knowledge gap.   
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 relations among groups with differing identities who are prone to conflict.”18  Using two case 
studies, they describe two organizations’ promotive and pre-emptive approaches to conflict 
prevention.  Promotive approaches are longer-term in nature and “are aimed at creating a 
foundation of trust between people of varying identities and engendering an appreciation for 
communal harmony.  These approaches are used before, during, and after violent conflict to lay a 
foundation for the prevention of further violence or to reduce the likelihood of escalation of an 
existing conflict.”19  Pre-emptive approaches are “designed to prepare people to dispel 
communal passion when it flares up.”20  The latter strategy seeks to avoid or ameliorate the 
effects of triggering events or flashpoints that often generate violence. 
 
With respect to the current research project, promotive approaches are more closely descriptive 
of the Cameroon context and longer-term nature of microcredit programming in Foyet.  
However, this approach does not specifically address the use of microcredit programming as a 
promotive tool.  We thus turn to the literature on micro-credit programming as a conflict 
mitigation tool. 
 
C.  Micro-Credit as a Conflict Mitigation Tool 
 
Karen Doyle writes in her 1998 Microfinance in the Wake of Conflict: Challenges and 
Opportunities report that “microfinance is being viewed as a tool that can serve multiple goals.  
Predominantly, it remains an economic development strategy that focuses on rebuilding and 
restarting local economies by providing needed financial services for enterprise creation.  But 
there is also consideration of its use as a relief and survival strategy in the immediate wake of 
disaster, and as a tool for peace and reconciliation” (emphasis added).21
 
The bulk of Doyle’s report focuses on post-conflict issues practitioners face in continuing or 
initiating microfinance services.  Essential preconditions to the continuation of microfinance 
services are discussed, including such things as a low intensity of conflict and reopened 
markets.22  Considerable attention is also given to the market for financial services in post-
conflict settings, as well as the need to target special populations such as returnees, internally 
displaced persons, refugees, demobilized soldiers, women, rural residents, and the like.23  These 
issues, however, are not currently in play in the Cameroon context. 
 
Of more direct interest is the “Program Characteristics” section of the report, in which the goals 
and strategies of microfinance institutions are revisited in the post-conflict context.  Doyle notes 
that “secondary goals…of social and political development…are viewed as highly 
complementary to primary economic goals” though she notes that “no practitioner thought it 
wise to place a priority on secondary goals over economic ones.”24
                                                 
18 Joseph B. Bock and Mary B. Anderson, "Dynamite Under the Intercommunal Bridge: How Can Aid 
Agencies Help Defuse It?" (1999, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 3), 327. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 329. 
21 Karen Doyle, Microfinance in the Wake of Conflict:  Challenges and Opportunities (1998, Bethesda, 
MD:  Microenterprise Best Practices), vii. 
22 Ibid., 7-12. 
23 Ibid., 13-25. 
24 Ibid., 27-28. 
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Practitioners’ adaptations to original microfinance strategies in post-conflict environments were 
wide-ranging; they included: changing the required size of solidarity groups in the face of 
extreme degrees of mistrust; targeting rural communities where levels of trust may be higher; 
lowering interest rates in the early stages of reconstruction; providing an interest-only grace 
period, halting deposits in post-conflict areas; adding new loan products such as agriculture 
loans; creating and training local partners; and offering more training to identify, assess, and 
select self-employment activities.25
 
Djateng’s hypothesis regarding the process of loan implementation as a key mechanism for 
conflict resolution in Foyet finds no direct analogue in Doyle’s report.  However, a United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees project initiated in 2000 does speak to this hypothesis.  
UNHCR’s Imagine Coexistence Initiative in Rwanda and Bosnia funded income-generating 
projects to members of their respective communities only if opposing ethnic groups worked 
together to implement the projects.  It was hoped that this contact would foster positive 
relationships and increased social ties between Hutus and Tutsis, Serbs and Croats or Serbs and 
Muslims.   
 
A July 2002 evaluation of the UNHCR project revealed that merely bringing the groups together 
for joint projects was insufficient to cause a transformation in these relationships.26  However, a 
detailed evaluation of the Rwandan part of the project three months later showed more positive 
results.  With respect to the micro grants mechanism of Oxfam’s Peacebuilding Pilot Project in 
Rwanda, evaluators found that “the project has influenced issues of cooperation, relationships, 
trust, tolerance, and justice…[and] the process of forming groups to handle the grants results in 
improved relations among community members.”27 It further found that “the nature of the grant 
process also seems to foster a positive approach among community members regarding their 
outlook on the future. They came to realize that the project will require their ongoing cooperation 
and focus on development issues in their communities in order to be sustainable.”28
 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
 
Data collection in support of this research was done almost entirely in the field during a two-
month period between June and August 2003.  Methods included individual interviews, 
document reviews, and an eight-page conflict questionnaire administered to a 20-person sample 
group and a 10-person control group. 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 31-33. 
26 Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Imagine Coexistence:  Assessing Refugee Reintegration Efforts 
in Divided Communities, July 2002.  Accessed 22 April 2003.  Available from:  
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/chrcr/projects/imagine.html.  
27 Amr Abdalla, Noa Davenport, and Mutahi Ngunyi, Oxfam Great Britain, Rwanda Programme: 
Peacebuilding Pilot Project Impact Assessment (October 2002), v. 
28 Ibid. 
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 A.  Individual Interviews  
 
Individual interviews conducted throughout the course of the research are listed in Appendix I.  
Among these interviewees were the Special Representative of UNHCR in Yaoundé, three U.S. 
Foreign Service Officers, two micro-credit professionals, a microfinance consultant to the caisse, 
GTZ employees, two Peace Corps volunteers working for larger credit unions in the Noun 
department, and the CVEC management committee.   UNHCR Representative Jacque Franquin 
provided information on refugees and internally displaced persons in Cameroon and in particular 
in the Foyet area.  This information began to reveal which forced migration dynamics may be 
affecting the local situation in Foyet and whether or not refugees seek or may be in need of 
microcredit services.29   
 
The U.S. Foreign Service Officers provided valuable background information on the general 
political situation in the country and broad-level economic issues such as how the Chad-
Cameroon pipeline is affecting the country’s coffers.  Consular Officer Elizabeth Pelletreau also 
had some knowledge of local-level tontines:  her consular duties require her to obtain written 
financial information from visa applicants, which she occasionally suspects are made-up records 
from informal tontines30.  She stressed the importance, and general dearth, of accurate record-
keeping in local level financial institutions.  The two microcredit professionals in Yaoundé 
explained their work and provided the broader context of microcredit activities in Cameroon 
within which CVEC fits.  Two American Peace Corps volunteers working in credit unions in 
Foumbot and Foumban provided their perspectives on the relative effectiveness of these 
institutions; their combined assessment was that the credit unions are characterized by gross 
inefficiency and corruption.  Volunteer Jennifer Conroy also described her institution’s hope of 
emulating the CVEC model in new microcredit institutions throughout the Noun Department, 
although she was extremely skeptical of its capacity to open and operate these new organizations 
given its general inability to effectively run the Foumban institution. 
 
Microfinance consultant Mr. Kengne was a valuable resource in providing information about 
CVEC’s operations and practices.  GTZ staff members were also helpful in providing broader 
context to their institution-supporting work and their impressions of CVEC’s leadership and 
work with Foyet-area residents. 
 
B.  Documents Review 
 
Demographic information for the Department of Noun was obtained from the Prefecture in 
Foumban.  This information included general population data, the number of villages in the 
department, some descriptive economic, religious and political data, and a highly detailed 
geographic description of the department.  However, it was not possible to obtain time series 
data showing the changing composition of the population, such as increases in the Bororo Fulani 
and Wahabi groups. 
 
                                                 
29 This information was directly relevant to concurrent research I conducted for the Alchemy Project. 
30 These are informal groups of individuals who pool their funds to allow members to borrow on a 
rotating basis. 
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 Governing regulations on the establishment of microfinance institutions in Cameroon provided 
general information on the legal and regulatory environment in which CVEC exists.31
Numerous GTZ management reports provided information on GTZ’s overall operations and 
assistance to CVEC.  Finally, I read CVEC’s monthly financial statements from January-June 
2003, and documents describing laws and policies governing microfinance structures in 
Cameroon. 
 
C.  The Survey Instrument  
 
i.  Designing the Questionnaire 
 
The principal source of data for this research was obtained through an 8-page questionnaire, 
attached in Appendix III.  Topics in the questionnaire included:  demographic information, 
household revenue and expenses, sources of conflicts in the village, questions of displacement, 
methods of conflict resolution, and recent loan activity at the caisse.  This questionnaire was 
created with significant assistance from microfinance consultant Mr. Kengne.32   The first two 
sections were included to gather information formerly unknown to the caisse about the 
composition and financial standing of its members.  The latter four sections focused more 
directly on the conflict factors and tensions in the community, how those related to existing and 
future displacement, existing channels for conflict resolution within the community, and 
interviewees’ loan activities with an eye toward examining whether and how loan recipients 
came into contact with or collaborated with others in using their loans. 
 
The ensuing discussion occasionally draws upon interviews conducted as part of an Alchemy 
Project evaluation conducted simultaneously.  The survey instrument for that research was a 
second questionnaire asking different questions about the impact of credit on beneficiaries’ lives.  
At points where this information is relevant to the current research agenda, it will be discussed. 
 
ii.  Selecting the Sample 
 
For the conflict questionnaire, a sample group of 20 caisse members was selected on July 1, with 
assistance from CVEC President Pentdap Inoussa and Controller Yacouba Ngambeket.  The 
criteria for selection included seeking individuals reflecting: 
 
• Gender diversity reflecting the village population; 
• Variety of business activities to reflect diversity of commercial activities; and, 
• Variety of marital status, religion, political parties, and village of residence. 
 
In selecting this group, the priority was to find people who likely had differing perceptions of 
and perspectives on the tensions in the village.  To that end, the third criterion was of particular 
concern. 
 
                                                 
31 These regulations are set forth in two documents promulgated by the Central African Regional Banking 
Commission (COBAC): 21 Reglements Relatifs aux Etabalissements de Microfinance, and Relatif aux 
conditions d’exercice et de controle de l’activite de microfinance dans la communaute economique et 
monetaire de l’afrique centrale. 
32 Kengne introduces himself only by his last name and all associates refer to him by his surname. 
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 The registration book of members contained only partial demographic information (sometimes 
marital status, sometimes the nature of business activity, etc.) so the President’s and Controller’s 
personal knowledge of each member was indispensable to the selection process.  However, 
because so much demographic information was missing from the registration book, direct 
comparison of most key attributes of the sample and village populations was difficult.  
Nonetheless, Table 1 below compares the known information about the sample to known 
information about Foyet.   
 
The most important aspects of this comparison relate to the under- or overrepresentation of 
certain characteristics in the sample group.  For example, the gender mix of recipients slightly 
over-represented men and natives to Foyet.  In terms of the conflict tensions that emerged, these 
slight divergences were not important.  This was not the case ethnically, in that while the sample 
group exactly reflected the ethnic composition of the village, conflicts between Bamoun farmers 
and Bororo pastoralists figured prominently in the interviews.  In retrospect it would have been 
wise to include Bororos in the interview sample.  Similarly, although information on the Tidjiani 
and Wahabi population proportions was not available, it would have been good to include more 
Wahabis in light of the importance of the religious tensions interviewees discussed.  One 
interesting divergence from the Foyet political profile was the fact that almost half the sample 
respondents declined to identify with either of the two major political groups. 
 
Table 1.  Sample Group Population Demographics, 
As Compared to Foyet Population 
 
 
Number % Number %
General
Male 10 50% 2526 47%
Female 10 50% 2820 53%
Head of Household 10 50% n/a n/a
Native of Foyet 18 90% 4651 87%
Transplant from elsewhere 2 10% 695 13%
Ethnicity
Bamoun 18 90% 4811 90%
Other 2 10% 535 10%
Religion
Muslim 19 95% 5079 95%
Wahabi 1 5% n/a n
Tidjiani 14 74% n/a n/a
Christian 1 5% 267 5%
Political Parties
RDPC 7 35% 2726 51%
UDC 4 20% 2620 49%
No Political Party 9 45% 0 0%
Economic Activities
Agriculture 11 55% 4811 90%
Agriculture and Commerce 7 35% n/a n/a
Commerce 3 15% 374 7%
Con
/a
f lict Sample Village
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iii.  The Control Group 
 
The conflict questionnaire was also administered to a small control group of 10 interviewees in a 
different village.  Criteria for selecting the village focused on finding a village of similar size 
with similar conflict factors but without access to credit via a comparable institution to CVEC.   
 
Based on these criteria, GTZ staff selected the village of Ngoundoup, 15-20 kilometers west of 
Foumban en route to the large city Bafoussam.  Village resident and GTZ partner Salifou 
Kpouyona translated for me.  The control group interviews began inauspiciously.  I wanted to 
select 10 individuals randomly from the village by visiting every fifth house starting from the 
main route.  Due to a communication breakdown, however, Kpouyona invited more than 30 
members of his and other associations to his house, where they waited for me the first morning 
for over two hours.  I interviewed the group as a whole, and then explained the random selection 
process, to which Kpouyona was amenable.  At his behest, however, I started by interviewing the 
village chief, and then proceeded with a more randomized process.   
 
I immediately noted several differences between the sample population and the control group.  
The problems confronting the two groups did not overlap very closely; displacement did not 
seem to be a serious problem among the control group interviewees, and not one person 
interviewed said he or she would consider leaving the village because of problems there.  This 
was in stark contrast to the response of CVEC interviewees, who largely said that they had 
considered leaving the village and knew of many others who had actually left.   
 
D. Methodological Problems  
 
This research suffered from numerous methodological problems.  One was simply the lack of 
quality information.  Demographic information about the department as a whole, for example, 
was piecemeal, dated, and hand-written.  This was amusing at the time, but also emblematic of 
the general difficulty of obtaining quality information.   
 
Other problems related more directly to the questionnaire and control group.  As noted above, 
the control group varied significantly from the conflict sample in Foyet; consequently, 
comparisons between the two groups are fairly limited.  There were at least four other problems. 
 
First, the vast majority of interviewees spoke Bamoun so French-Bamoun interpretation was 
necessary during the interviews.  Interpreters had been promised by GTZ and ultimately six 
members of the CVEC management committee took turns interpreting.  From a methodological 
perspective, this was problematic since their presence potentially inhibited interviewees’ ability 
to speak freely, particularly to criticize the caisse.33  In addition, the presence of caisse leadership 
                                                 
33 Even so, I observed a high degree of ease and comfortableness between interviewees and caisse leaders 
during my interviews.  I attribute this to three things:  (1) CVEC leaders are themselves members of the 
caisse and community, not outside technical experts brought in to manage the organization, thus 
enhancing a sense of trust among members; (2) CVEC members elected the management team, giving 
them a sense of ownership and control over who managed their accounts; and (3) every member of the 
management committee struck me as wholeheartedly committed to operating CVEC transparently and 
honestly as well as using CVEC to help bring area village residents out of chronic poverty. 
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 during administration of the conflict questionnaires potentially biased interviewees’ descriptions 
of conflicts and their ideas for resolution toward credit-based solutions.  This seemed particularly 
evident in respondents’ descriptions of marital problems in the village:  all who mentioned it 
described this issue in economic terms. 
 
A second perhaps more serious problem was that interpreters often suggested illustrative answers 
when interviewees were stuck.  This was particularly the case in Section 3 of the conflict 
questionnaire, when interviewees are asked to identify the types of conflicts most frequently 
encountered in the village.  The impact of this approach became apparent during the control 
group interviews, in which several interviewees spoke French so I could communicate directly 
with them.  I refrained from suggesting answers in Section 3, and the responses among these 
interviewees differed significantly from the sample group. 
 
Third, at times the interpreters misunderstood questions.  For example, more than halfway 
through the concurrent Alchemy interviews I administered, one interpreter asked whether 
Question 26 referred to the amount of money earned each month or the amount of money 
required to run the business (the latter).  In later interviews, I clarified the intention each time, 
although the confusion makes the accuracy of amounts recorded in earlier interviews 
questionable.  There may have been similar confusion on some of the conflict questions.  
 
Finally, a methodological problem never totally overcome was the loss of some amount of 
precision and detail due to my mediocre French skills.  Where a native French speaker might 
report on the same data with more nuance and understanding, my analysis may be clumsy and 
somewhat more generic. 
 
 
V. PROFILE OF FOYET 
 
A.  Socio-Political and Economic Context 
 
CVEC is in the village of Foyet, a rural community of 5346 people located roughly 15 
kilometers north of Foumban (see the map in Appendix III).  For convenience, the table below 
replicates some information from Table 1 to provide a sense of the composition of the 
community.  Note that CVEC members come from nearly a dozen surrounding villages, but 
demographic information on those villages was not available. 
   
Number Percent
Gender Men 2526 47%
Women 2820 53%
Total 5346 100%
Age 0-4 years 100 2%
4-19 years 1930 36%
20-59 years 3037 57%
Over 60 279 5%
Total 5346 100%
Table 2:  Foyet Population Statistics
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 Foyet is located in the Noun Department.  It is heavily Muslim and the center of the Bamoun 
ethnic group (the Bamoun sultan lives in a German colonial-era palace in Foumban, a large town 
about 20 kilometers south of Foyet).  The Noun department has a largely rural economy, with 
agriculture, herding, and small commerce comprising the main economic activities.  CVEC 
members typically sell their goods in the small market in Foyet (Tuesdays and Saturdays) or take 
them to larger markets in Foumban or Foumbot.  However, poor road conditions make this 
transport difficult and expensive.   
 
President Paul Biya’s party, the Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC), 
and the opposition party Union Démocratique du Cameroun (UDC) are both strongly 
represented in Foyet with 51% and 49% membership, respectively.34  Reportedly, the Noun 
department is a UDC stronghold although official government representatives belong to the 
RDPC.  Complicating this administrative and political context is the traditional chefferie system 
in which chiefs govern the region at various levels.  The sultan in Foumban, for example, is a 
“first degree” chief, while Foyet’s chief is of the third degree.  They remain at the center of 
village life, although their governmental responsibilities and influence are harder to pinpoint.  
Notably, the two village chiefs interviewed both had Paul Biya posters displayed prominently in 
their homes, although Foyet’s chief said he had no official political party. 
 
B.  Existing Displacement 
 
UNHCR’s provisional 2002 Population Statistics report states that 63,596 asylum-seekers, 
refugees, and others of concern were living in Cameroon at the end of 2002.35  The refugee 
population consists primarily of 39,289 Chadians and some 17,000 Nigerians who are, according 
to UNHCR Special Representative Jacque Franquin, largely self-settled.  The map in Appendix 
III shows where they live as “areas of interest.”  Foumban is well south of these areas of interest.   
 
CVEC is thus located in a fairly stable area and serves a local population that has been living 
there for years.  Of the twenty caisse members interviewed, nearly all of them were born in Foyet 
or surrounding villages.  Two women were born in villages farther away but had married men 
from Foyet some time ago.  The main migratory population of concern in this area is the Bororo 
Fulani pastoralists, who do not use CVEC’s services but whose cattle occasionally damage the 
crops of local farmers. 
 
According to a village-wide survey undertaken in 2002,36 emigration from Foyet is caused 
primarily by farmers seeking more fertile land, young people seeking employment in urban 
areas, women marrying outside the village, and individuals taking up temporary work (e.g. at 
harvest times).37
 
                                                 
34 These numbers are reported in the Foyet Sondage but methodology and definitions are not included.  
35 UNHCR 2002 Population Statistics, Table 1 (accessed 12 September 2003), available at 
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=3f3769672&page=statistics. 
36 The methodology of this questionnaire, the results of which were summarized in a two-page document 
Foyet (Sondage Septembre 2002) is unknown; the data were presented to me as a fait accomplit and I did 
not learn how the information was collected. 
37 Lamé Seidou and Pendtap Inoussa.  Foyet (Sondage Septembre 2002).  
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 C.  Available Financial Services 
 
Three types of financial services are available in Foyet and the surrounding villages: 
 
1. Tontines.  These are informal groups of individuals who pool their funds to allow 
members to borrow on a rotating basis.  Alchemy interviewees noted that loan amounts in 
tontines are typically very small and one has to wait for one’s “turn” regardless of when 
financial need arises.  Nonetheless, some CVEC members are also members of the six 
tontines in Foyet.38 
 
2. Individuals.  Individuals with means make short-term loans to individuals in need and 
typically require in-kind repayment, the value of which is easily twice or even three times 
the amount of the loan.  For example, a loan-seeker may receive a 10,000f ($16 USD) 
loan in return for a sack of coffee beans whose market value is between 20,000f and 
30,000f ($32-50 USD). 
 
3. Caisses.  These village banks typically offer savings and credit services to members.  
They are organized more or less formally; eight caisses exist in Foyet, although CVEC is 
clearly the largest and most well-known.  Some of these caisses, in fact, keep their cash 
holdings in the CVEC safe. 
 
Larger credit unions and banks exist in Foumban, but no interviewees held accounts there, 
primarily because of lack of funds but also as a result of the difficulty and cost of transportation.  
One woman had held an account with a credit union in Foumbot, a town some 40 kilometers 
away, but she moved her account to CVEC last year because of its closer location. 
 
 
VI. CAISSE VILLAGOISE D’EPARGNE ET DE CRÉDIT  
 
A.  General Background 
 
CVEC was founded 17 years ago under the leadership of its current president, Pentdap Inoussa.  
Starting with just a handful of members from Foyet, the caisse today has 277 members from over 
a dozen villages in the area.  Until 1999, Inoussa was the sole administrator of the caisse, with a 
founding member guarding CVEC’s cash holdings at his home.  In 2002, the caisse obtained a 
safe, and in August 2003 CVEC’s operations moved from Inoussa’s living room to a new 
building constructed by the members. 
 
In 1999, Inoussa contacted the German development agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenabeit (GTZ) for technical assistance because, with its growing 
membership, CVEC’s management needs were becoming burdensome.  Since that time, GTZ 
has provided significant support to the caisse, including: 
 
• Training workshops on basic accounting and management principles; 
• Government registration (currently in process); 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
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 • Writing the previously oral internal regulations on paper; 
• Supporting a gender perspective and advocating women’s roles in the caisse39; 
• Helping promote self-evaluation and self-management; 
• Helping update the accounting system of the caisse for more accurate monthly reports; 
and, 
• Contributing financially to the revolving fund. 
 
GTZ intended to reduce these support roles in fall 2003, with CVEC becoming essentially self-
sufficient.40  At that time the 7-member management committee, elected last year by CVEC 
members, were slated to become entirely responsible for the caisse’s operations.  This committee 
comprises the President, Secretary, Treasurer, two cashiers, and two controllers.  CVEC is open 
for business to its members two days a week, and the management committee meets on Sundays 
to discuss loan applications.  Their work is unpaid.   
 
B.  Products and Services 
 
The caisse offers three products to its members. 
 
1. Savings.  Two types of savings accounts are available.  A non-interest bearing account 
called “Dépot à Verse” (DAV) allows members to withdraw money at any time for a fee 
of 100f per withdrawal.  Deposits can be made at any time, but members holding just a 
DAV account may not obtain loans from the caisse. 
 
The “Dépot à Terme” (DAT) accounts pay one percent interest per month and require a 
one-year term on the initial amount deposited.  Deposits may be made at no cost at any 
time, and DAT account-holders are eligible to apply for loans from the caisse. 
 
2. Credit.  Loans are predominantly made for “productive” activities, including agriculture, 
commerce, health, school fees, etc.41  The interest rate is 2% per month, with the 
borrower’s DAT account providing a guarantee against the amount loaned.  If the 
borrower defaults on the loan, the caisse can take possession of the DAT account and if 
this is not sufficient, may thereafter seize assets at the borrower’s house.  As of the May 
2003 financial report, seven of 201 of active loans were in arrears, representing 2.1% of 
the 12.6 million francs currently on loan. 
 
Terms for the short-term loans are flexible, although among the questionnaire 
respondents the most frequent loan term was 4 months.  Payments may be made per 
month or in one lump sum at the end of the term. 
 
                                                 
39 56% of CVEC members are women and two members of the 7-member management committee are 
women. 
40 Microfinance consultant Mr. Kengne will continue to audit CVEC’s books once a month. 
41 CVEC financial documents list eight categories of loans:  agriculture, animal breeding, commercial 
activities, school fees, health expenses, “social” projects, and “other.”  The management committee has, 
since June 2003, dispensed with the “social” category. 
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 3. Fertilizer.  Because of geographical conditions, productive farming in the immediate 
Foyet vicinity is not possible without fertilizer.42  Last year, CVEC began selling 
fertilizer to its members at 11,000f per sack for two reasons:  to provide the much-needed 
product to its members at a lower price than is available elsewhere, and to make a small 
profit on the sales to augment the revolving fund.43  Members may purchase fertilizer in 
one of three ways: in cash, by withdrawing funds from one’s DAV account (for a 100f 
fee), or by using money in one’s DAT account.  With the DAT option, the member loses 
the interest on the amount withdrawn.  If the amount of money in the DAT account is 
insufficient, the member may apply for a loan for the outstanding amount. 
 
C.  Loan Requirements  
 
The CVEC management committee does not follow a rigid loan formula, although several 
criteria are important in evaluating loan applications: 
 
• The money must be used for productive (i.e. income-generating) activities, with the 
exception of health care and school fees; 
• Applicants must have a DAT account; 
• The amount requested must be itemized; 
• The amount requested cannot be substantially greater than the amount applicants hold in 
their DAT account (in the case of individual loans); and, 
• Loan proceeds must be used as stated in the application (fungibility is thus discouraged). 
 
CVEC makes loans to individuals and groups, and management committee members informally 
track loan recipients’ use of funds by observing their activities after they receive their loan 
proceeds44 and noting whether deposits to their savings accounts have increased.   
 
Table 3 below summarizes key loan data for the caisse, current as of June 2003; this data comes 
from the Alchemy Project interviews.45  Interviewees by and large receive multiple micro-credit 
loans (one each year, two each year, etc.), which they use for continuing business needs, school 
fees, and health expenses.   
 
                                                 
42 I was told, however, that fertile fields where fertilizer is not needed exist as close as four kilometers 
away. 
43 According to Mr. Kengne, if the caisse buys 500,000f worth of fertilizer, it can sell it to its members for 
550,000f, thus contributing 50,000f or about $100 to the revolving fund. 
44 Management committee members observe such things as whether recipients bought fertilizer as they 
said they would, whether their inventory increased, etc. 
45 As of June 2003, six loan recipients were in arrears, representing 3% of the number of active loans and 
1.3% of the total outstanding loan balance.  See Villagoise d’Epargne et de Crédit.  June 2003.  Fiches 
Suivi CVEC. 
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 Number of currently active loans 207
Total outstanding loan balance $21,502 
Average loan per client $103 
Average savings per client $56 
Repayment rate 97%
Loan period 1 mo. to 1 yr; 3-4 mo. most common
Interest rate 2% per month
Loan size $50-$250
Repayment plans Clients may make periodic payments or 
single payment at end of loan term
Gender of borrowers 35% male, 56% female, 9% groups
Table 3:  Key Loan Data for CVEC
 
 
 
VII. Conflict Research Results 
 
A.  Sources and Dimensions of Conflict Factors 
 
At the start of the field research, GTZ staff46 brainstormed a list of what they termed the “factors 
of instability”47 in the area (Table 4 below).  This session identified areas of tension to look for 
during interviews with CVEC members, but the discussion remained at a fairly high level of 
abstraction without much specific data.  For example, staff members discussed at length the 
problem of “external elites” exerting undue influence in the villages, but between my poor 
French at the beginning of the summer and being pressed for time, I did not obtain more detailed 
information or anecdotes on the who, how, and where of this issue.  In the course of the 
interviews, the dynamics of the external elite problem became clearer (and will be discussed 
below), although historical data as to how long the various problems have existed in the area 
were never precisely delineated.   
 
- General Conflicts
Confrontations
Destruction of consumer goods
Displacement of persons
Confiscation of land
Killings
- Agro-Pastoral Conflicts
- Opposition against External Elites
- Political Struggles
- Corruption in Community Financial Institutions
- Lack of Transparency in Community Financial Institutions
- Illiteracy
Table 4:  Local Instability Factors Identified by GTZ Staff 
Members
 
                                                 
46 GTZ staff members are all Cameroonians who live in Foumban or the nearby city of Bafoussam. 
47 This term is synonymous with conflict factors and tensions. 
 16
  
This GTZ list differs somewhat from the list of conflict factors generated by the interviewees. 
Specifically, interviewees did not mention corruption in financial institutions, lack of 
transparency in same, or illiteracy as major tensions in the community.  The problems they did 
elucidate are shown in Table 5 below and form the basis of the discussion that follows. 
 
- Farmers and Cattle Raisers (19 mentions)
- Wahabis and Tidjianis (12)
- Political Parties (10)
- Marital problems (6)
Parents and Children (5)
- Other (6)
Poverty (4)
Intra-Christian problems (1)
Tensions between the rich and poor (1)
Table 5:  Conflict Factors Identified by 
Interviewees, Listed by Frequency of Mention
 
 
i.  Agro-Pastoral Problems 
 
By far the most frequently mentioned conflict was the agro-pastoral tension between area 
farmers and pastoralists resulting from crop destruction.  Interviewees, none of whom raised 
animals as part of their livelihood strategy, blamed the animal herders for this destruction, which 
was caused either by the animals trampling or eating the crops.  The problem of crop destruction 
had two dimensions:  the first involved the loss of village garden crops from local goats and 
sheep; the second involved the loss of field crops from cattle belonging to Bororo Fulani 
pastoralists.  A few interviewees said they had tried to construct natural barriers out of brush and 
branches, but animals could easily breach these fences, so they were not an adequate solution.   
 
Reactions were mixed as to whether this destruction occurred through negligence or was 
intentional; two people with enclosed fields said that Bororos opened the gates to allow their 
cattle to graze on their crops. One person said that, while laws on the books require 
reimbursement for destroyed crops, Bororos avoided this payment by bribing public officials.  
Another said cows were in his fields two to three times per month; yet another said that the 
trespassing occurred at night when no one was around to drive them out.  A fundamental 
weakness in understanding this problem was that no pastoralists were interviewed.  Sheep and 
goatherders were not included because of poor sample selection, and nomadic Bororos were 
neither members of the community nor members of CVEC.  I was told anecdotally of a handful 
of murders of Bororo by angry farmers over the last 6-8 years.  This comported with the GTZ 
staff descriptions of this problem, but such killings were never verified.  
 
As for solutions, eleven respondents believed that building durable enclosures around the fields 
or animals would solve the problem; three said the pastoralists needed to better guard their 
animals; three others said that compensation for lost crop yields should be better enforced.  One 
said that greater cooperation between farmers and herders was needed.  In total, nine respondents 
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 said that loans were needed to make it possible to build a durable enclosure because farmers 
lacked the financial means to do so. 
 
ii.  Wahabis and Tidjianis 
 
Problems between these two Muslim factions were the second-most named tension among 
interviewees, with twelve mentions.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that Tidjianis are the majority 
Muslim population group in the area, at least some of whom consider the more conservative 
Wahabis to be “newcomers” to the region.48  With only one self-identified Wahabi in the sample 
group, who did not identify this tension in the first place, what follows is how Tidjiani 
interviewees experience the problem.   
 
Three respondents described the problem in theological terms:  Wahabi and Tidjiani 
understandings of the Koran and the requirements of Islam differ substantially with Wahabis 
adhering to more literal and conservative interpretations and Tidjianis holding more liberal views 
on the same religious issues (e.g., prayer rituals).  According to one interviewee, these 
differences led to occasional fistfights; another said there was no voluntary or purposeful 
interaction between the two groups.  A second cluster of responses focused on leadership and 
responsibility within each confessional group; four people said that a lack of good leadership and 
internal corruption caused a breakdown between the two groups.  The third set of descriptions 
focused around the influence of external religious actors.  Five people said that Wahabis from 
Foumban and elsewhere used bribes, pressure, or spiritual favors to convert Tidjianis to their 
stricter, more conservative sect of Islam.  Many respondents were angry and resentful as they 
described this bribery; one man described Wahabis as untrustworthy and bad-intentioned people 
who do not respect the laws.  He said that killings had not occurred in the village, though another 
respondent described Wahabis hiring Tidjianis to go into the cities and kill for them.   
 
Regardless of how respondents described the problem, there was near unanimity among them 
that a key cause of the problem was lack of adequate resources on the part of local Tidjianis.49  
This made them vulnerable to the influence of Wahabis in ways they would not have been, were 
they more financially secure.  As such, six people believed that increasing Tidjiani incomes 
would solve the problem, while two believed that Wahabi leaders needed to refrain from bribery 
and exploitation.  One person thought the two groups needed to be kept separate, and someone 
else believed no solution was possible.  Seven respondents believed that a loan from CVEC or a 
comparable institution would ameliorate this problem. 
 
iii.  Political Tensions 
 
The third most frequently mentioned conflict factor, the political one, was by every account 
cyclical in nature.   As mentioned earlier, President Biya’s RDPC party is the dominant party in 
Cameroon, although the Noun department is a UDC stronghold.  According to respondents, 
during election periods members of the major political parties descend on the village and seek to 
win votes through bribes; party members were also accused of denigrating or lying about the 
                                                 
48 Ahmadou Njimbam El Hadj, personal interview (Prefecture of Noun Department, Foumban. 15 July 
2003).  Several interviewees intimated the same thing.  
49 Ten of eleven respondents mentioned poverty as a key reason why the problem existed.  
Unsurprisingly, other reasons cited were religious convictions, leadership, and corruption. 
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 opponents, or of promising development assistance that never materialized.  One person said 
there was no public violence during this period; another said that “private” fistfights occurred 
between more agitated proponents of the parties.  One person said that division within families 
was acute during this period, as members of any given family might belong to different political 
groups. 
 
There were significant divergences in respondents’ beliefs about the causes of this problem.  
Three people believed it was simply a matter of political conviction and inevitable ideological 
clashes between members of the political groups.  Three others believed it to be a problem of 
financial means and/or livelihood activity—in their view, it was local men with nothing else to 
do with their time who got embroiled in the issues.  If they were working, according to these 
respondents, this problem would not be as severe because they would simply be too busy to get 
involved.  Three others pinned the problem on the politicians who, in their bids to keep their 
elected posts, used propaganda, bribery, and corruption in the villages to buy votes. 
 
Five people believed that increasing revenue and/or livelihood activities for locals would help 
solve the problem.  The idea here was similar to the idea mentioned above for the intra-Muslim 
problem:  increasing revenue would make locals less vulnerable to the influence of the outsiders.  
Two others believed that an injection of responsibility on the part of political leaders and locals 
who involved themselves in the issue was in order.  One respondent believed that external 
political actors needed to stay away and people needed to “sleep” during election period, while 
one other person believed a solution was all but impossible to find.  All five interviewees who 
believed that increasing revenue was the solution to this problem believed that credit from the 
caisse would be helpful. 
 
iv.  Marital Conflicts 
 
All six interviewees who mentioned this problem described it in economic terms:  parents who 
had problems paying for food, clothes, medical needs, and school fees for their children found 
themselves blaming one another for not doing enough to support the family.  Opinions ranged as 
to whether one spouse was willfully refusing to help provide income or whether opportunities to 
do so were lacking.  Respondents were unanimous, however, in believing that increasing 
livelihood options for the spouses was the solution.  They also unanimously believed that loans 
to start up or support small business activities would help, and four people specifically said that 
each spouse needed to have his or her own loan to finance independent income-generating 
projects. 
 
v.  Problems between Parents and Children 
 
Four respondents described the problem between parents and children as being economic in 
nature.  Youths who wished to continue their schooling beyond primary school50 became 
frustrated with parents who could not afford to pay the fees or living expenses.  Without the 
schooling option and needing to earn money, such youths would leave the village for the larger 
cities and small commerce opportunities.  Two interviewees noted that even if their children 
                                                 
50 The village of Foyet was starting construction on a second primary school while I was there, but all 
secondary schools were in Foumban or other far-away towns and cities.  Youths who wished to go on to 
secondary school had to go live at school, making it an even more expensive undertaking. 
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 were willing to forego schooling and start working in the village, parents did not have the means 
to help them start a small business so they were forced to leave. Two others said there was 
simply no work in the village for youths.  One person described the problem as a generational 
one:  children were becoming modern and did not respect the traditional ways or stories of their 
parents. 
 
It was certainly evident that young people were not living in the village.  In the sample group, the 
youngest interviewee was a 19-year old married woman and there was a nine-year difference 
between her and the next-youngest interviewee.  More telling was the fact that I saw very few 
young people in Foyet village.  By and large, village residents consisted of parents in their late 
twenties and beyond with very young children (age 6 and under). 
 
Three interviewees believed that increasing resources was the solution, with two specifying that 
the parents’ incomes should be augmented so they are able either to pay for secondary school 
fees or help their children start businesses in the village.  Two others believed that village 
development was needed to create local opportunities to work, with one mentioning that parents 
should find ways to pay their children to work with them.  All five interviewees saw credit as the 
solution. 
 
vi.  Other 
 
Four people cited general poverty as one of the most pressing conflict factors in the village.  One 
person said that even if one had products to offer at the local market, there was no one there to 
buy them.  Another pointed to the general exodus of the youth as evidence of this poverty and 
lack of income-generating opportunities.  All of these respondents said that credit would solve 
the problem, though this was somewhat curious since the problem of the local market seemed to 
be as much one of demand as one of supply.  Another person mentioned tensions between the 
local rich and poor as a significant problem.  Finally, one person described intra-Christian 
problems in the village and cited the lack of responsible religious leaders as the cause.  She 
believed the solution was to find more honest and transparent leaders. 
 
B.  Conflict Factors as Sources of Displacement 
 
Section 4 of the interview guide asked respondents whether the conflict factors they had just 
described caused people to leave the area.51  Interviewees unanimously agreed that people did 
leave because of these problems, although no one had a good sense of how many people had left 
over time.52
 
When asked to elaborate, most people identified general poverty and difficulty of life in the 
village as the main motivating factors.  One person said religious and political problems 
contributed to the exodus.  Two people said that the agro-pastoral problem caused farmers to 
cultivate fields further away (requiring them to be away for weeks or months on end) or to seek 
commercial livelihood strategies in the larger towns and cities.  However, another person said 
that the agro-pastoral problem did not cause farmers to leave; they seemed simply to adapt and 
                                                 
51 Clearly the weakness in this question was that it asked respondents to speculate on why others had left. 
52 One person guessed 1000 people, another 720 people, but most others simply said that “many, many” 
people had left.  
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 get used to having a certain amount of their crop yields be periodically destroyed by animals.  
The clearest trend, by far, was the steady departure of Foyet’s young people, which for many 
people raises the serious question of how the village can survive, let alone develop, if its young 
people continue to leave just as they enter the prime of their productive lives.   
 
In all events, these responses suggest that emigration from Foyet occurs for primarily economic 
reasons.  It is possible that religious, political, agro-pastoral, and familial tensions act as 
accelerating factors in individuals’ decisions to leave, but not having spoken to anyone who 
actually left, it is impossible to make conclusive arguments to this end.  What did seem clear was 
that these conflict factors were sources of instability in the village but were not the prime or sole 
cause of any sort of mass exodus from the village.  If any of the identified conflict factors were 
to cause such a migration, they would likely be the Bororo and Wahabi problems. These 
problems would probably have to escalate substantially in degree or severity to cause an acute 
migration problem, but this judgment is based in part on the relative “newness” of these issues in 
the area (both groups were identified as newcomers by several interviewees) and by the degree 
of resentment and anger expressed by some respondents in describing the problems. 
 
One very surprising finding in the interview process was the statement by six people that they 
themselves have chosen to stay in the village despite economic hardship and other tensions 
because they had access to loans from the caisse.  This direct and positive impact of CVEC’s 
credit services on village residents’ livelihoods and decisions to stay in the village could be a key 
strength upon which CVEC could build future conflict mitigation strategies.  We will return to 
this idea presently. 
 
C.  Control Group Data 
 
As mentioned earlier, the control group in Ngoundoup did not have the same community 
dynamics as Foyet and as such, data collected there is of limited comparative use.  The main 
problems identified by interviewees there revolved around village boundary disputes, corruption 
among local authorities, lack of village development, and generalized poverty.  Interviewees had 
limited access to formal financial services, using instead informal tontines for their borrowing 
needs.  In Ngoundoup, interviewees did not think of microcredit as a solution to the problems 
they faced, which could be related both to translator issues as discussed in the methodology 
section and the fact that their problems simply did not seem amenable to solution via financial 
input.  Not a single respondent considered leaving the village, which is likely related to the fact 
that Ngoundoup is adjacent to a major roadway connecting Foumban and Bafoussam, which in 
turn provides better access to markets and customers.  Moreover, there is a major market in 
nearby Foumbot, a town that is considered to be the breadbasket of the region.  In short, the 
control group highlighted the greater difficulties residents of Foyet and other relatively isolated 
villagers face in terms of access to markets and availability of commercial opportunities. 
 
D.  Existing Conflict Mitigation Role of CVEC 
 
Contrary to Djateng’s claim at the outset of this research project, no evidence emerged showing 
that CVEC’s loan recipients worked with others in the course of implementing their loans.  
Several Alchemy interviewees said the loan amounts were too small to generate work with 
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 others53 or the nature of the loan was simply not amenable to cooperation, as in the case of loans 
to pay for school fees or health expenses.  This, however, misses the point a bit.  Individuals who 
may have wished to do joint business projects with others were self-selected partnerships and 
thus unlikely to involve people in some sort of conflict with one another; the same was true of 
groups with accounts at the caisse.54  The two groups interviewed for the Alchemy research 
project claimed to have diverse memberships of people across gender, political, and religious 
divides, but none admitted to any conflicts between members of their group:  they either didn’t 
exist, interviewees didn’t know about them, and/or loans were not used in such a way that the 
group members discussed or were aware of the conflicts.  Moreover, the example Djateng gave 
of loan recipients pooling their funds to buy fertilizer, seeds, and other supplies at discount rates, 
was made somewhat moot when the caisse began to sell fertilizer at a discount rate, facilitated by 
its own bulk purchases.  As mentioned above, however, CVEC does appear to play a role in 
stemming economic migration from Foyet.  The fact that six individuals made conscious 
decisions to stay in the village because they had access to loan funds is notable and promising. 
 
E.  Assumptions and Omissions 
 
Before returning to the central research question, a few comments about assumptions and 
omissions in the research are in order. 
 
i.  Who is embroiled in these community tensions, anyway? 
 
Except for the agro-pastoral problem, few interviewees admitted to being involved in any of the 
conflict factors they mentioned.  In many interviews, the problems were described as being at 
arm’s length, almost with an “us-them” dichotomy that seemed to deny their own involvement.  
It was those idle men who caused the political problems in the community, it was other couples 
who had marital problems, it was the religious and political leaders who were largely at fault.  
These responses could have been due to a flaw in the survey instrument, a failure on my part to 
ask better follow-up questions, or a simple reluctance on the part of interviewees to admit to 
being part of a given problem.  In any event, the respondents’ dissociation from the problems 
they described made it difficult to identify opportunities for CVEC to leverage its microcredit 
programs to mitigate tensions its existing members face. The other problem, of course, was that 
in some cases the other party to the tension was not a member of the community or of CVEC.  
This was particularly the case with respect to the Bororo and Wahabi populations. 
  
ii.  In what direction does causality run?  
 
A fundamental assumption of this research is that CVEC was the entity exerting an influence (or 
not) on local conflict dynamics.  The possibility of local dynamics exerting an influence on the 
operations or composition of the caisse was not considered. This relates to the following point. 
 
                                                 
53 More ambitious business projects that may have been partnerships but were not fully funded became 
easier to implement individually as smaller income-generating projects. 
54 These groups ranged from 8-50 people in size. 
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 iii.  Does microcredit programming cause conflict? 
 
A fundamental oversight in my research was the question of whether and how CVEC operations 
and microcredit services may be creating conflicts in the village and surrounding area.  This 
could occur in at least two ways:  first, membership in the caisse is ostensibly open to all, but the 
nebulous requirement of being a person of good “moral character” could be used to exclude 
individuals or groups deemed undesirable by the management committee.  Second, the purposes 
to which CVEC loans are put could be a source of conflict through, for example, increased 
competition with existing businesses.  Either way, more information on this aspect of local 
conflict dynamics could have been obtained had village residents who were not members of the 
caisse been interviewed.  
 
F.  Revisiting the Central Research Question 
 
Notwithstanding the above limitations of and omissions from the research, the results of the field 
research did provide useful data with which to answer the key research question.  To recap, this 
project sought to understand whether and how CVEC’s revolving fund contributes to the 
mitigation of conflict and displacement in the area.  Djateng’s hypothesis was that CVEC does 
play such a role, particularly in the process by which loan recipients use their loans.   
 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that CVEC does not currently play such a role.  As 
already noted, few interviewees discussed or admitted to their own involvement in the conflicts 
they described.  It thus became clear that, at least in the sample group, loan recipients did not 
discuss or resolve these tensions in the course of implementing their CVEC loan projects.  
Further, the nature of the relationship between the resolution of conflicts at this level and the 
broader potential for reducing conflict and displacement in the area is difficult to establish for 
two reasons.  First, since there was no evidence of conflicts being addressed during the loan 
process, no relationship between the two levels could be determined.  Second, the types of 
problems preoccupying the interviewees were largely local in nature and many seemed to be 
perpetual issues that any poor community might face (e.g., family tensions and political issues.) 
The two major exceptions were the agro-pastoral and intra-Muslim tensions, which seem to be 
somewhat newer problems with possibly grave escalatory potential. 
 
 
VIII. POTENTIAL CONFLICT MITIGATION ROLES FOR CVEC 
 
All that being said, the surprising refutation of the initial hypothesis has served to broaden the 
field of possible mechanisms by which CVEC could mitigate local conflict and displacement.  
As Table 6 below shows, interviewees believe that many of the identified conflict tensions could 
be resolved through greater availability and use of credit.  But how, exactly? 
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 - Farmers and Cattle Raisers (19 mentions) 60%
- Wahabis and Tidjianis (12) 43%
- Political Parties (10) 33%
- Marital problems (6) 100%
- Parents and Children (5) 60%
- Other (6) 60%
Table 6:  Would Loans Solve the Problem?  Percent 
Responding Affirmatively, by Issue
 
 
Posited below are three mechanisms by which microcredit programming could theoretically 
contribute to the mitigation the above conflict factors.   
 
A.  Direct Mitigation 
 
The direct approach to conflict mitigation would occur when the substantive projects funded 
with microcredit resources directly affect conflict pressures such as the agro-pastoral tension in 
Foyet.  If farmers were to receive loans to build fences, the problem of neglected herds 
wandering onto cultivated fields and gardens would be greatly diminished.  It is less clear that 
this approach would solve the problem of pastoralists or herders deliberately allowing their 
animals to graze on farmers’ crops.  However, this second aspect of the problem might be able to 
be addressed through a second form of conflict mitigation. 
 
B.  Process Mitigation 
 
This mechanism would be in play when individuals or groups worked or otherwise cooperated 
with members of an “opposing” group as part of a microcredit strategy of some kind.  This 
assumes that the “contact hypothesis” is operable55 which, as amply discussed above, does not 
currently seem to occur between CVEC members as Djateng hypothesized.  This may well be 
because CVEC has not been purposeful in doing so, as the UNCHR Imagine Coexistence project 
was.  Adopting an explicit and purposeful strategy to encourage members of different groups to 
work together could be helpful in this regard.  Another type of process mitigation might involve 
CVEC agreeing to fund workshops or other gatherings in which conflict participants gather to 
discuss, brainstorm, or otherwise work on the problems between them.  Such an approach could 
be appropriate between farmers and Bororo pastoralists and could help them understand each 
others’ motivations, limitations, and frustrations with the current situation.  It might also be 
helpful on the Tidjiani-Wahabi front, although negative opinions seem to be much more 
entrenched on this issue and it is unclear how willing members of these groups would be to meet 
together. 
 
C.  Indirect Mitigation   
 
A third conflict mitigation mechanism is so-called “indirect” mitigation, in which the general 
alleviation of poverty would yield benefits in conflict arenas that are fueled by the persistent lack 
of revenue and livelihood support.  In the CVEC context, this would affect the religious, 
                                                 
55 See, generally, H.D. Forbes, Ethnic Conflict:  Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis (1997;  
Connecticut:  Yale University Press). 
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 political, spousal, and parental problems described by interviewees.  This mechanism 
corresponds to what the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict calls “structural 
prevention.”56  Indirect mitigation would address poverty as a root cause of these conflict factors. 
 
Each of these conflict mitigation mechanisms should be viewed as complementary to other 
existing conflict resolution mechanisms in the village.  Indeed, the Foyet village chief was 
widely viewed by interviewees as playing a key role in solving their interpersonal conflicts.  If 
the chief were unable to solve their problems, or if the parties were dissatisfied with the results, 
they had recourse to the Tribunal in Foumban. 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The two big surprises in this research were (1) the refutation of Djateng’s initial hypothesis about 
process mitigation and (2) the degree to which emigration from Foyet was caused by economic 
hardship and not the conflict factors identified by interviewees.  Even so, it was interesting to 
note the degree to which respondents believed that greater use and availability of credit could 
ameliorate these problems, as shown in Table 6.   
 
In light of these comments, research in Foyet could productively continue in at least two 
directions.  First, one could continue to focus on Foyet’s conflict factors and look more in depth 
at an increased conflict mitigation role for the organization.  Even if the local tensions identified 
do not currently point toward an outbreak of violence or a sudden mass exodus, there does 
remain a migration outflow due to poverty and lack of livelihood opportunities.  CVEC could 
focus on better understanding the “indirect role” it plays or could play in stemming this outflow. 
 
A second research direction could pick up on the agro-pastoral and religious conflicts to better 
understand the nature and extent of influence the Bororo Fulani and Wahabi populations exert in 
the Foyet/Foumban area.  As already mentioned, little information was gleaned as to the historic 
dimensions of these problems, although both groups seemed to be considered to be “new” to the 
area and as such, they could be destabilizing factors of a different type.  According to World Fish 
Center biologist Randall Brummett,57 the Bororos’ traditional grazing lands have been shifting in 
recent years as a result of desertification in the extreme north.  They have thus been moving 
farther and farther south in search of grazing lands for their cattle.  To the degree that this is 
accurate, how are the Bororo Fulani people adapting to this displacement?  How are their 
livelihoods affected by moving into areas where conflicts with local residents become more 
prevalent?  What role could financial services such as microcredit lending programs play in 
supporting their livelihoods?  With respect to the Wahabi population, what has caused them to 
migrate to this part of Cameroon?  How do they view relations with the Tidjiani majority? 
 
With respect to the existing literature and research on microcredit as a tool of conflict mitigation, 
two things stand out.  First, the three mechanisms described above have not been articulated as 
such in the literature reviewed to date.  They may thus be a valuable addition to Karen Doyle’s 
list of strategies microcredit practitioners offer in service of secondary peace support goals.  
                                                 
56 See Chapter 4, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Preventing Deadly Conflict: 
Final Report (1997, Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict). 
 
57 Personal interview, 20 August 2003, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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 Second, it seems clear that more information and evaluation is needed on the existing 
mechanisms by which microcredit practitioners do attempt to address local conflict factors.   
 
The broader implications of this research, namely whether and how microcredit programs in 
general can play conflict mitigation roles, are of central interest to the author.  Indeed, this topic 
will be the focus of her master’s thesis at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, due to be 
completed in May 2004.  The brief discussion above of three possible conflict mitigation 
mechanisms leaves unanswered many questions, such as whether there is a difference between 
using conflict mitigation strategies in unstable peace contexts versus those in active conflict 
zones or those in post-conflict environments.  
 
To the degree that these conflict mitigation mechanisms are adopted by CVEC or other 
microcredit organizations to ameliorate conflict factors and other communal tensions, they may 
constitute “promotive approaches” in conflict prevention.  As Anderson and Bock write, 
“[p]romotive approaches undertaken regularly and consistently may, in fact, deter or prevent 
communal violence more than we know.  We cannot know what would have been had such 
programs not existed.  There is some evidence that groups who are involved in activities focused 
on achieving a common goal are not easily prone to manipulation that leads to violence toward 
each other.”58
 
In short, the potential of direct, indirect, and process mitigation strategies to be used 
“promotively” by microcredit entities operating in conflict prone regions is of considerable and 
continuing interest.  It is hoped that continued thesis research in this direction will yield 
additional useful guidance for microcredit professionals and clients in leveraging their programs 
in support of peaceful development. 
                                                 
58 Bock and Anderson, 332. 
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 Appendix I:  Individual Interviews 
 
 
16 June Berthe Mafouo Tiomela, Regional Director 
Crédit Communautaire d’Afrique (Meeting took place in Yaoundé) 
 
17 June Wolfgang Ossoa, Director of Training and Resource Center 
MIFED Microfinance & Développement  
Projet Crédit Rural Décentralisé—PCRD (Yaoundé) 
 
  UNHCR Representative Jacque Franquin (Yaoundé) 
 
Elizabeth Pelletreau, Consular Officer 
  United States Embassy (Yaoundé) 
 
Robert Gonzalez, Political Officer 
United States Embassy (Yaoundé) 
 
19 June Andrew Veprek, Economic Officer 
  United States Embassy (Yaoundé) 
 
20 June Christiane Kayser 
Consultant to Appui aux Initiatives de Base et des Groupements de 
Soutien (AAOB) (Yaoundé) 
 
24 June Pentdap Inoussa, President 
  Caisse Villageoise d’Epargne et de Crédit (Foumban) 
 
24 June Célestine Lienou, GTZ/AAOB (Foumban) 
 
24/25 June Ahmadou Njoya Mforifoum, GTZ/AAOB (Foumban) 
 
24/25 July CVEC Management Committee (Foyet) 
  Pendtap Inoussa, President 
  Joseph Ngounga, Secretary 
  Pasma Nkoualiagnigni, Principal Controller 
  Yacouba Ngambeket, Controller 
  Mohamed Bachir Ngoucheme, Principle Cashier 
  Awawou Foupouapouognigni, Cashier 
  Aminatou Mapon 
 
June-Aug Flaubert Djateng, GTZ/AAOB Director (Foumban, Bafoussam)  
 
Mr. Kengne, Microfinance Consultant 
Service d'Appui aux Initiatives Locales de Développement (SAILD) (Foumban,  
Foyet) 
 
Jennifer Conroy, Vijay Rajendran, U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers (Foumban) 
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 August 20 Randall Brummett, World Fish Center biologist (Nairobi) 
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 Appendix II:  Interpreters 
 
Pendtap Inoussa  
Pasma Nkoualiagnigni Awawou 
Joseph Ngounga  
Yacouba Ngambeket 
Awawou Foupouapouognigni  
Salifou Kpouyona (in Ngoundoup) 
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 Appendix III:  UNHCR Map of Cameroon 
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 Appendix IV:  Conflict Questionnaire 
 
 
Nom de la personne qui effectue l’entretien: 
Date: 
Lieu : 
Code de la personne interrogée: 
 
 
Section 1.  Questions d’identification de la personne 
 
100  Sexe 
  Homme   Femme   
 
101 Âge 
  __________     
 
102 Langue parlé 
  Français   Bamoun   Autres   
 
103 Situation Matrimoniel 
  Marie   Célibataire   Veuf(ve)   Autres 
 
104 Chef du Ménage 
  Oui   Non   
 
105 Nombre de personnes dans le menage 
  __________     
 
106 Nombre de personnes à chargé 
  __________     
 
107 Religion 
  Musulman   Catholique   Autres  
 
107.1 Si musulman  
  Wahabi   Tidjiani   
 
108 Parti politique 
  UDC        Autres 
 
109 Membre d’un groupe de travaille 
  Oui   Non    
 
110 Ethnie ou Tribu 
  Bamoun   Bororo   Bamiléké   Autres 
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111 Education 
  Primaire   Secondaire   Université   Autres 
 
 
112 Origine (ce village ou autre)  
  Autothone   Allogene   
 
112.1 Si allogene, pays/village d’origine 
  __________     
 
113 Statut 
  Membre du 
    village 
  Personne  
    revenue au village 
  Déplacé interne   Autre  
(à spécifier) 
_______________ 
 
 
Section 2 :  Questions des revenus et depenses 
 
200 Sources de revenus 
  Agriculture   Ιlevage   Commerce   Petits métiers   Autres 
 
200.1 Si petits métiers ou autres, préciser 
  ______________     
 
201 Revenus 
  Annuel   Par mois     Par semaine  
 
201.1 Agriculture  
 Nombre de sacs de 100K ou 
cajots (tomates) 
Revenu 
Mais    
Haricots   
Tomates   
Autres (à préciser la nature et 
quantité) _____________ 
  
 
Prix des produits (approximatif) 
1 sac mais 6000-15,000 FCFA 
1 sac haricots 16,000-25,000 FCFA
1 cajot tomate 1500-6000 FCFA 
 
201.2 Ιleveurs  
 Nombre  Revenu 
Bœufs   
Chevres   
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 Autres (à préciser la nature et 
quantité) _____________ 
  
 
 
Prix des animaux (approximatif) 
1 Boeuf 80,000-150,000 FCFA
1 Chevre 10,000-25,000 FCFA 
 
201.3 Commerçant  
Recettes par jour (FCFA) Revenu (10% de recettes) 
  
 
202 Dépenses annuelles 
 
202.1 Sources de dépenses 
  Production   Scolarité   Santé   Fêtes   Autres  
 ____________ 
 
202.2 Dépenses de production 
  Agriculture   Ιlevage    Commerçant   Autres 
     _____________ 
 
203 Ιpargne annuelle (ou par mois ou par semaine) 
  ______________    
 
 
Section 3:  Sources des problèmes 
 
300 Types de problèmes rencontrés 
 
  Agriculture v. éleveurs 
  Wahibis v. Tidjanis 
  Partis politiques 
  Jeunes v. Vieux 
  Lettrés vs. Analphabéts 
  Ιpouses v. Ιpoux 
  Autorités traditionelle vs. Ιlus de peuple
  Ιlites exterieur v. Membres du village 
  Autres (à préciser)   _______________ 
 
 
300.1 Problèmes agriculture v. éleveurs
 
300.11 Comment se manifeste? 
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 300.12 Pourquoi est-ce que ce problème existe? 
  Destruction de cultures    Autres (à precisér)  _______________
 
300.13 Comment éviter? 
  Bêtes dans l’enclos   Champs dans l’enclos   Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
 
 
300.14 Raisons pour lesquelles il peut ne pas avoir l’enclos pour les betes/cultures 
  Manqué d’argent 
 
  Manqué de volonté 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
______________ 
 
300.15 Solution aux raisons évoquées 
  Crédit   Ιpargne   Formation   Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.2 Problèmes Wahabis v. Tidjanis
 
300.21 Comment se manifeste? 
 
 
300.22 Pourquoi est-ce que ce problème existe? 
  Convictions religieuse   Retombé financière   Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.23 Comment éviter? 
  Formation   Augmentation de revenu    Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.24 Si augmentation de révenu, comment? 
  Crédit pour production 
 
  Epargne pour production 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.3 Problèmes partis politiques
 
300.31 Comment se manifeste? 
 
 
300.32 Pourquoi est-ce que ce problème existe? 
  Convictions politiques  
 
  Retombé financière 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.33 Comment éviter? 
  Formation   Augmentation de revenu    Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
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 300.34 Si augmentation de revenus, comment? 
  Crédit pour production 
 
  Epargne pour production 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.4 Problèmes jeunes v. vieux
 
300.41 Comment se manifeste? 
 
 
 
300.42 Pourquoi est-ce que ce problème existe? 
  Ideologie ou  
    philosophie 
  Leadership   Retombé 
    financière 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.43 Comment éviter? 
  Formation   Augmentation de revenu    Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.44 Si augmentation de révenus, comment? 
  Crédit pour production 
 
  Epargne pour production 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.5 Problèmes lettrés v. analphabets
 
300.51 Comment se manifeste? 
 
 
300.52 Pourquoi est-ce que ce problème existe? 
  Ideologie ou  
    philosophie 
  Leadership   Retombé 
    financière 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.53 Comment éviter? 
  Formation   Augmentation de revenu    Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.54 Si augmentation de revenus, comment? 
  Crédit pour production 
 
  Epargne pour production 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.6 Problèmes epouses/epoux
 
300.61 Comment se manifeste? 
 
 
300.62 Pourquoi est-ce que ce problème existe? 
  Insatisfaction de besoins 
financièrs 
  Opinions ou 
ideologie 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
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300.63 Comment éviter? 
  Formation ou 
sensibilisation 
  Augmentation de 
revenu 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.64 Si augmentation de revenus, comment? 
  Crédit pour production 
 
  Epargne pour production 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
 
 
300.7 Problèmes autorités traditionelle/élus de peuple
 
300.71 Comment se manifeste? 
 
300.72 Pourquoi est-ce que ce problème existe? 
  Leadership 
 
  Retombé financière 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.73 Comment éviter? 
  Formation ou 
sensibilisation 
  Augmentation de 
revenu 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.74 Si augmentation de revenus, comment? 
  Crédit pour production 
 
  Epargne pour production 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.8 Problèmes Ιlites exterieur v. Membres du village 
 
300.81 Comment se manifeste ? 
 
 
300.82 Pourquoi est-ce que ce problème existe? 
  Leadership 
 
  Retombé financière 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.83 Comment éviter? 
  Formation ou 
sensibilisation 
  Augmentation de 
revenu 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.84 Si augmentation de revenus, comment? 
  Crédit pour production 
 
  Epargne pour production 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.9 Autres problèmes
 
300.91 Naturs des problèmes 
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300.92 Comment se manifeste? 
 
300.93 Pourquoi? 
 
300.94 Comment éviter? 
  Formation ou 
sensibilisation 
  Augmentation de 
revenu 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
 
300.95 Si augmentation de revenus, comment? 
  Crédit pour production 
 
  Epargne pour production 
 
  Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
Section 4:  Questions des problèmes et déplacement 
 
400 Est-ce que ces problèmes font que les personnes partent du village? 
 
400.1 Si oui, combien de personnes pensez-vous sont parties à cause de ces  
problèmes?  
 
400.2 αu sont-ils allé?  
 
401 Est-ce que les personnes sont parties du village à cause d’autres raisons?   
 
401.1 Si oui, qui sont partis et pour quels raisons? 
 
401.2 αu sont-ils allé? 
 
402 Y a-t-il de problèmes dans le village pour lesquels vous voulez fouir le village?  
 
402.1 Si oui, quels problèmes vous feront partir, et pourquoi? 
 
402.2 αu est-ce que vous iriez? 
 
403 Est-ce que le montant de vos revenus ferait une difference dans  
votre decision à partir?  Comment?   
 
403.1 De quels types de ressources est-ce que vous aviez besoin à decider a  
rester?  
  les espèces   élévage   la terre   Autres (à préciser) 
   _______________ 
 
 
Section 5:  Questions des méthodes de résolutions les problemes 
 
500 Comment est-ce que les problèmes dans le village sont resolus? 
  Tribunale   Chefferie   Chef du cartier   Autres (à precisér) 
_______________ 
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501 Quels sont les avantages de ce(s) processus? 
 
502 Quels sont les désavantages de ce(s) processus? 
 
503 Quand les membres du village utilisent ce(s) processus, est-ce que  
tout le monde est content avec la décision? 
 
504 Si quelqu’un est malheureux avec la décision, qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire?  
 
505 Si vous aviez un probleme avec quelqu’un du village, a qui est-ce que  
vous demandiez l’assistance? 
 
Section 6:  Questions de prêts 
 
600 Combien de prêts avez-vous obtenu depuis 2001? 
 
601 Pour quel raison(s)? 
 
602 Le montant était combien? 
 
603 Pour combien de temps? 
 
604 Quel était le taux d’interêt? 
 
605 Est-ce que vous vous etes associé avec les autres pour utiliser v⊥tre prêt?  
 
605.1 Si oui, avec qui vous vous etes associé? 
 
605.2 De quel nature est-ce que c’etait la collaboration? 
   Achêter les intrants à un mieux prix   Autres (à precisér) _______________ 
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